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CAPITAL POSITIONS OF JAPANESE BANKS
ABSTRACT
This paper measures and analyzes two types of hidden capital at Japanese
banks: (1) the net undervaluation preaent in accounting measures of on-
balance-sheet assets and liabilities and (2) the net economic value of off-
balance-sheet items. A model is constructed that explains changes in both
types of capital as functions of holding that explains changes in both types of
capital as functions of holding-period returns earned in Japan on stocks,
bonds, yen, and real estate. The model is applied to annual data covering
1975-1989 and a four-class size/charter partition of the Japanese banking
system. For each type of hidden capital and each class of bank, the model
develops estimates of the stock-market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange, snd
real estate sensitivities of returns to bank stockholders.
Only the stock-market sensitivities prove significant at five percent.
This finding leads us to investigate what happens when we analyze Japanese bsnk
stock returns by means of stationary and split-sample market models. Time-
series regressions show that very large Japanese banks have developed stock-
market betas in excess of two and that the value of a bank's beta has come to
increase with measures of its size and accounting leverage.
Future research will investigate the sensibility of our results to
different ways of pooling data from individual banka and to more-sophisticated
methods for estimating various parameters. We also plan to extend the analysis
by imbedding it in a model of how variations in bank-customer contracting
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I.Introduction
In recent years, Japanese banks have become major playera in world
finance. Many apparently knowledgeable observers attribute thia development
to the maintenance of inappropriately low capital requirements by Japanese
authorities (Corrigan, 1987; Pettway, Kaneko, and Young, 1990). However,
Japanese banks are not undercapitalized. Their stocks show market
capitalizations that average several timea the value of the banks'
accounting net worths (Kane, 1987; Baer and Mote, 1989).
Divergences between accounting and stock-market estimates may be
described as "hidden capital." Kane and Unal (1990) develop a method for
testing hypotheses about the determinants of two types of hidden capital:
the misvaluation of on-balance-sheet items (post-acquisition gains and
losses that, although they remain unbooked, are bookable upon the sale of
the item under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, CA.AP) and
intangible values which CAAP currently designates to be unbookable off-
balance-aheet items.
This paper shows that Japanese banks are highly capitalized on a
market-value basis and tests hypotheses about the determinants of hidden
capital at Japanese banks. We first develop estimates of a valuation ratio,
k, by which to adjust the book value of a firm's net worth and of the net
market value of unbookable equity elements, U. These parameters are
estimated by regressing crosssectionally the market value of the
institution's market capitalization on the book value of its accounting net
worth. This regression equation forms the heart of what Kane and Unal (1990)
call the Statistical Market Value Accounting Model, SMVAM.2
A second block of the model endogenizes changes in k and U aa functions
of ex post holding period returns on stocks, bonds, yen, and Japanese real
estate. This formulation permits us not only to test hypotheses about the
determinants of both forms of hidden capital, but to use the model to
explain variation in the market, interest, foreign-exchange, end real-estate
sensitivities of an institution's stock.
The analysis extracts market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange, and
real-estate sensitivities from a time series of cross-section regressions
that use accounting and rste-of-return information to explain the market
vslue of stockholder equity claims. The first block of the model is
estimated for each of the 15 years 1975-1989 for four categories of Japanese
banks. The four-class partition of the banking system represents a
conventional Japanese classification that uses the names city banks, long-
term credit banks, trust banks, end regional banks. This classification
closely approximates a size-based partition, with city banks having the
largest average asset size end regional banks the smallest average asset
size throughout the period we study.
II. Model and Diagnostic Checks
The SMVAM is estimated separately at each date for members of each
class of institution:
MV_U+kBV+e. (1)3
MV and BV denote the market and book value of firmequity.U is interpreted
aa the market value of unbookable equity, while k is the valuation ratio
that aerves to adjust the value of bookable items to market. These
coefficients measure the de facto deceptiveness of the Japanese accounting
system. Unless both U —0and k —1,the accounting or book value of a
bank's capital represents a biased estimate of the market value of
stockholder equity. If the estimated intercept is significantly positive
(negative) ,unbookableassets and liabilities serve as a net hidden source
of (drain on) institutional capital.
Equation (1) assumes that a single mark-up or mark-down ratio, k
applies to all accounting values reported by the institution. In effect, a
single valuation ratio k is assumed to apply to every component of each
institution's book equity. We test this restriction by estimating different
coefficients for aggregate assets and aggregate liabilities for each class
of bank. However, except for regional banks, the hypothesis of a common k
proves impossible to reject. Even for regional banks, significant
differences between asset and liability valuation ratios emerge only after
1985.
A second diagnostic check is to teat for nonlinear terms in SHVAM. In
particular, we investigate the effect of introducing a squared or quadratic
term in B1. The coefficient of the squared term proves insignificant at S
percent for city banks in all years. However, although we choose not to
pursue the issue here, the evidence suggests that a nonlinear specification
may be appropriate in some years and especially for smaller institutions.4
Long-term credit and trust banks show signifitant and positive coefficients
for in years 1982-84 and 1988. For regional banks, the By2 coefficient
proves significantly negative in 1977 and 1981-83, but becomes positive and
significant in later years, 1985-88.
The parameters of the linear SMVAM are U and k. When returns on
competitive assets change over time, these parameters should respond. Using
an annual observation period, we approximate this response by a linear
model of market returns, interest rates, dollar investments in yen, and
returns on Japanese teal estate:
Ut - —+ $ Rmt+ + + fi+ v (2)
k -k1
—4 + R+ + + + w. (3)
Rt Rg and RLt represent holding-period returns on a stock-market
index, a bond index, dollar investments in yen, and Japanese real estate,
respectively. We include and to test the often-heard conjecture that
Japanese bank stock has benefited greatly from appreciation in the yen and
in Japanese real estate. The v and w are stochastic error terms. The slope
coefficients measure the market, interest-rate, foreign-exchange, and real-
estate sensitivity of SMVAN's parameters.
Equations (2) and (3) are offered as flexible functional forms that
parameterize in an interpretable and parsimonious way revaluations that5
asset markets make continually. Results to be developed in later sections of
this paper indicate that movements in Ut and k ere explained predominantly
by the first influence (stock returns), with the other variables having no
significant effects. The Japanese stock-market index proves significant for
every class of bank. This is consistent with a further finding that Japanese
banks have come to own over 40 percent of the universe of Japanese corporate
stocks. This makes investment in these banks' stock shares in large part a
leveraged investment in the Japanese stock market as a whole.
To furnish a complementary perspective, we also estimate a traditional
multi-index market model. Using this model, stock-market betas for large
Japanese banks are shown to surge sharply upward after 1983.
III. Data and Sample Characteristics
The data set includes market and book values for the capital and total
assets of every Japanese bank in existence during the 1975-1989 sample
period. For regional banks, the sample size varies over the sample period,
butI)city banks, 3 long-term credit banks and 6 trust banks exist
throughout. (A seventh trust bank exists, but its stock does not trade.)
The number of regional banks sampled expands from 44 to 91.
Data are obtained from Nihon Keizai Shimbun America, Inc. Market values
are determined in accordance with Japanese corporate reporting practices as
of March 31st and calculated as the product of share price and number of
shares outstanding. The book value of equity capital totals accounting6
entries for stock subscription, legal reserves and earned surplus at the
same dates.
Chsrt 1 reports ratios of the book value of stockholder equity tototal
assets. Although these ratios are much lower than those reported by
comparable U.S. banks, these banks cannot reasonably be characterized as
lacking in capital. Chart 2 clarifies that over the sample period a high and
rising ratio of mean market value to book value obtained for city banks,
long-term credit banks, trust banks and regional banks.
These charts indicate that hidden capital expands greatly during the
late 1980s. The MV/SV ratio first exceeds 2 for city banks and long-term
credit banks in 1982 and for trust banks in 1984. The ratio continues to
increase until 1987, when it peaks for the first three classes, at 8.9,
10.6, and 11.8, respectively. From these respective peaks, MV/BV declines to
5.8, 7.5 and 4.9 by 1989.
Compared to the other three classes, regional banks show a lower and
less-volatile MV/8V ratio. The ratio does not exceed two until 1986, peak's
at 3.28 two years later, and declines to 2.96 in 1989.
The indices needed to estimate equations (2) and (3) have to be
approximated. Although data on dividend yields are lacking. Japanese
dividend rates are reputed to be low and relatively stable. This makes it
reasonable to approximate the holding-period return on a stock by its annual
rate of price appreciation.7
Chart 3 tracks annual percentage changes to the dates shown in the
mean market capitalization of each class of bank. This price appreciation is
the major portion of the return realized by stockholders in Japanese banks.
Chart 4 tracks percentage returns in four potential determinants of U
and k. The 225-stock Tokyo index constructed by Nikkei (R) is used as a
proxy for the stock market as a whole. The Nikkei bond index is used to
calculate a proxy holding-period return for bonds. The index reports a daily
average yield on public and private debt securities. We derive annual
holding-period returns from this index by treating the underlying bonds as





Returnson real estate come from Japan Real Estate Research Institute
(JRERI). JRERI surveys 140 major cities in Japan twice a year (in March and
September) and constructs a land price index. Again, lacking parallel data
on periodic rents, the annualpercentagechanges in the index are treated as
a proxy for real-estate returns in Japan. Data for the Nikkei stock-market
and bond indices and the JRERI land price index are obtained from Nihon
Keizai Shimbun.
Finally, yen returns (Rft) are proxied by percentage change in the
value of the yen against U.S. dollar, using data compiled by the World Bank.8
IV. SMVAMResults
SMVAN's accounting equation has two parameters. Charts 5 and 6 display
the pattern of annual cross-sectional estimates at each of the four bank
classes. With only three banks in the long-term credit bank class, separate
regressions for this class have only one degree of freedom and large
standard errors. Nevertheless, covariance or dummy-variable analysis shows
that these institutions differ so significantly from the other three classes
that it is inappropriate to pooi them with any other class.
To teat the U —0and k —1hypotheaia of "fully informative accounting
values" for each class separately, we focus on the time series of
coefficient deviations from the hypothesized values. Table 1 reports test
reaultaThe combined U—0 and k—l condition which would make recorded equity
an unbiased estimate of market value ia rejected for city banka in all years
and is accepted for long-term credit banks only in 1980. Accounting
representations of truat banks prove deceptive in all but two years: 1980
and 1981. In contrast, accounting data for regional banks appear reliable
through 1984. But after that date, the regional banks' k proves
significantly greater than unity.
For city banks, the deviations of U and k retain a single sign
throughout. U is negative and significant, indicating net unbookable items
as a drain on equity. As a percentage of mean MV, this drain begins at 6
percent in 1975, peaks in 1984 at 40 percent, and decreases to 23 percent in
1989. The valuation ratio for bookable items proves aignificantly in excess
of one and reaches very high levels in the late 1980a.9
Ahigh valuation ratio constitutes evidence of on-balance-sheet "hidden
capital." Securities and real estate that are carried on bank books at
historical cost become increasingly undervalued when market values trend
upward. Throughout the late l980s, unbooked but bookable capital gains
appear substantial. If a market-value accounting system were used, increases
(and decreases) in market values would be booked as earnings as they accrue
and reflected in the book value of equity. However, if used as a basis for
calculating taxable income, market-value tax accounting would simultaneously
create an immediate taxliabilityon accrued gains. Under the system of
cash-flow tax accounting that is in place, Japanese banks effect tax savings
by not immediately realizing (i.e., encashing) their capital gains.
For large banks, off-balance-sheet equity proves large and negative in
many instances, especially in the later years of our sample. The pattern of
secular fall and 1988-89 recovery mirrors the rise and fall of the MV/SV
ratiosreported in Chart 2. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
observed negative off-balance-sheet positions can be conceived
predominantly as reserves for deferred taxes on unrealized gains in stock
and real-estate holdings. U must also capture the capitalized value of the
implicit net subsidy or tax associated with restrictions or advantages
conferred on banks by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF). We hold that
movements in taxreservesdominate U because it is unlikely that the net
advantageousness of MOF restrictions could change as rapidly from year to
year as our estimates of U do.10
Weturn now to the revaluation equations (2) and (3), which are
estimated in Tables 2 and 3. For every bank class, results are qualitatively
the same. Off-balance-sheet equity decreases as stock returns increase
(significantly so for city and long-term credit banks). It also decreases
with bond and foreign-exchange returns and rises with land returns, but not
significantly. The valuation ratio k for on-balance-sheer items shows in
each case an opposite pattern, and again only the stock return ever achieves
significance. However, because error terms are apt to be correlated within
and across hank classes, ordinary-least-squares estimates of standard etrors
are biased upward. More-efficient estimation methods might well render real-
estate, foreign-exchange, or bond returns significant in at least some
cases.
During the first quarter of 1990, while the Nikkei 225 index declined
by roughly 25 percent, the market capitalization of individual city banks
declined by as much as 33 percent. To the extent these banks represent a
leveraged investment in the stock market as a whole, a massive stock-market
decline could rapidly undermine the strength of large Japanese banks'
capital poaitiona.
V. Results for the Multi-Index Market Model
Tables 2 and 3 assign Rm and the other index variables opposite effects
on U and k. The hypothesis that U may be interpreted principally as a
reserve for deferred taxes implies that these variables' effects through k
should strongly outweigh their effects through U.11
Fitting a multi-index market model (MItO() provides a straightforward
way to check this. The version of MIMI'! that we fit expands the basic market
model by adding bond returns, real-estate returns, and returns on dollar
investments in yen. We include returns on yen and real-estate even though
they prove insignificant in Tables 2 and 3, because we want to allow for the
possibility that effects operating through U and k might cumulate to
significance. The MIMI'! stochastic return-generating process specifies that
the return R on portfolio p is:
pt — mp mt +rpt+ Pfpft +LpLt +z. (4)
In (4), amp' rp' fifp' and Lp measure the portfolio's systematic market,
interest-rate, foreign-exchange and real-estate risk.
We construct Rt as an equal-weighted portfolio of returns for every
bank in each class. For each claaa, Table 4 reports pooled time-series,
cross-section estimates of equation (4).
For each class, the net sensitivity of bank stock price appreciation to
market returns turns out to be positive and significant. For the largest
three size classes, stock-market betas all exceed two. Because Charts 3, 5,
and 6 suggest a mid-l980s shift in return-generating processes for banks, we
experiment with relsxing the assumption of stationarity by fitting the model
separately to 1975-83 and 1984-89 under the restriction 4fp and Lp equal12
I
zero.1 In these runs, betas prove negative for the three largest size
classes in the early years and positive and large during the 1984-1989
period only.2
The striking feature of the various runs is the sky-high level of
market risk toward which the average member of the first three bsnk size
classes evolved. These betas range from 2 to 3, which is two to three times
the magnitude of the estimates both for regional Japanese banks and of
parallel estimates for large U.S. banks obtained by Unal and Kane (1988)
with quarterly 1975-1985 data. These high betas confirm the hypothesis that,
when a leveraged institution has a large diversified position in the stock
market, its market capitalization moves by a multiple of the price movements
obaerved for the market as a whole.
In the Japanese stock-market decline of the first quarter of 1990, the
prices of the high-beta bank stocks fell more rapidly than the overall
Japanese market index. This has important implications for policymakers. The
1Support for the timing of this sample partition may also be found in
regulatory events. Pectway, Tarpley, and Yamada (1988) associate a post-1983
expansion of bank risk-taking with a reduction in administrative guidance,
while Cargill and Royama (1988) note an acceleration in money-market
development.
2txperimenca not reported here allow each of Rf and to be the second
index and confirm the usefulness of going on to allow for structural shifts
in (2) and (3) as well.13
capital position of banks that invest heavily in corporate stock is more
volatile than the stock market itself. The market capitalization of high-
beta bank stocks can decline suddenly and markedly. In a world where
governments insure de facto all of the debts of large domestic banks, this
volatility implies that, to protect Japanese taxpayers, risk-based market-
value capital requirements should be designed to increase with the size of
each bank's market beta.
Individual-Bank Runs. To investigate within-class variation in market betas,
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the one-index version of equation
(4) for the individual banks in each class for which we have data for all 15
years. Although we do not report results for the four-index model, R, RL
and Rf prove significant in time-series runs for only few of these banks.
The market betas found for most members of each of the three largest
size classes prove to be of the same order of magnitude as in the pooled
run. The 24 regional, banks that show significant market betas appear to
follow portfolio strategies that are more similar to those followed by
larger institutions than to those pursued by fellow members of their charter
class.
When we allow for a possible structural shift in individual market
betas after 1983, high market betas develop only during the later subsample.
A visual inspection of the data reveals that high betas are typically driven
by 1985, 1987 and 1988 observations. In these years, the market
capitalizations of institutions show extraordinary increases relative to the14
market. These beta estimates are much higher than those reported by Pettway,
Tapley and Ysmada (1988). Pettway, Tapley and Ysmad.a cover different sample
years (1982-1983 and 1984-1986) and use daily data. Neglecting data from
1987-89 would tend to lower our beta estimates substantially. To some
degree, these authors' lower betas may also reflect downward bias due to
employing daily data on stocks that fail to trade daily.
Tracking Variation in Market Betas at Individual Banks. Pettway, Sicherman,
and Yamada (1990) contrast an observed tendency for market betas of Japanese
torporations to increase with size against the stylized tendency for market
betas to decline with size for U.S. firma (Reinganum, 1981; Chang and
Prinegar, 1989). These authors attribute this differential behavior to
presumed differences in management objectives at U.S. and Japanese
corporations. While U.S. corporations' internal diversification is believed
to increase with size, in Japan agency costs associated lender influence on
decisions by corporate managers are held to rise with size. Agency costs in
Japanese banking relationships are studied by Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1989).
The following hQ regression equation supports the hypothesis that
Japanese banks with high market betas are larger and more highly leveraged
than other banks:
4— -.81 -32.1(BV /TA )+ 0.22(ln TA ),R2—22. (5) jm (-.43) (1.98) (2.06)15
In (5), t-values are reported in parenthesis, is bank j's market
betas from Table 5, while BV and TA denote the th bank's average book-
value and total assets over 1975-1989.
When the market model and the ad hoc equation (5) are fitted separately
to 1975-83 and 1984-89, the magnitude and significance of the slope
coefficients may be traced entirely to the 1984-89 period. Before 1984,
leverage does not significantly affect a Japanese bank's market beta. As
with U.S. banks, betas significantly decline with size. Hence, this
divergence between U.S. and Japanese bank behavior is of recent origin.
I. Opportunities for Future Research
Although the ordinary-least-squares estimates reported in this paper
seem reliable enough to support qualitative inferences, more sophisticated
econometric procedures may be able to establish a role for bond, land, or
foreign-exchange returns. In future research, we plan to use seemingly
unrelated regression, crossed regression, nonlinear formulations,
simultaneous-equation models, and heteroskedasticity adjustments. We also
plan to use covariance analysis to disaggregate regional banks into high-
beta and low-beta groups and to test whether SMVAN equations for banks with
similar betas can be pooled across charter types.
We further plan to analyze contracting arrangements inherent in
Japanese financial institutions and markets. The goal of this investigation
is to help us to sort out how contracting arrangements between and among16
0
banks and related and unrelated corporations affect the size and
distribution of agency costs in Japan.17
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Table1: Summary Outcomes at
of the Hypotheses that
5-percent
U Equals
Significance of Separate Tests







U k U k U k U k
1975 0 >1 0 >1 0 >1 0 >1
1976 0 >1 + >1 0 >1 0 1
1977 0 >1 + >1 0 1 0 1
1978 - >1 0 >1 0 >1 0 1
1979 - >1 + 1 0 >1 0
1980 - >1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1981 - >1 0 >1 0 1 0 1
1982 - >1 - >1 0 >1 0 1
1983 - >1 0 >1 0 1 0 1
1984 - >1 - >1 0 >1 0 1
1985 - >1 - >1 0 >1 0 >1
1986 - >1 - >1 - >1 0 >1
1987 - >1 - >1 - >1 0 >1
1988 - >1 - >1 - >1 0 >1
1989 - >1 - >1 >1 0 >1Table 2 iscrmates of the Full Repricing Model 2) and
a Deleted Two-Index ModeL (TIM) for Changes i the
Value of 0ff-BaLanceSheer Equity at Four Clasoeo
of Japanese Banks, 1975-1989
Exchange
Stock Bonde Land Rate
U $' R2 ADJR2
CityBanks
Model (2): 172 .2024* •397 1873 -581 .50 28
(241) (774) (664) (2880) (874)
TIM: 237 -1679* -376 .44
(129) (587) (489)
Loce-Terrt Credit Banks
Model (2) 533 _52l7* -2171 6457 -2390 .45 21
(734) (2355) (2021) (8762) (2659)
TIM: 735 -3817* -1982 .35 .23
(407) (1842) (1535)
Trust Banks
ModeL (2): 40 -363 -489 1358 -273 .36 08
(132) (426) (366) (1586) (481)
TIN: 100 -194 -523 .27 .13
(72) (327) (272)
ReoionaL Banks
Model (2): .97 35 -23 98 -23 .32 .02
(8.9) (28) (24) (106) (32)
TIM: 5.0 -21 -24 .19 .04
(4.9) (22) (18)
1. The holding-period return on bond. i. approxi.at.d by the following formula:
Rt —BondYield1 -BondYi.ld -BondYield t-1
Bond Yie1d
2. Standard error, Sr. atatsd in brack.t. and astsri.kadancE.coefficient, whose value
differs significantly fro, zeroat 5p.rc.nt.
3. Each intercept represent, a trend te .a.ur.d in billion, of yen.Table 3: Estimates of the Full Repricing Model (3) and A Iolered
Two-Index Model (TIM) for Changes io the Valuation Ratio 4
for On-Balance-Sheet Equity at Four Classes of Japanese Banko.
1975-1989
Exchange
Stock Bonds Land Rate
fl fl AIJ7
Cl:y banks
Model (3): -.77 12* 2.4 -17 4.7 .41
(1.79) (5) (4.9) [21] (6.4)
TIM: -1.4 9,4* 2.5 .31 (8
(.9) (4.4) (3.7)
long-Term Credit Banks
Model (3): -2.4 23* 10 -30 IS .49 24
(3.1) (10) (8) (37) (II)
TIM: -3.3 17* 97 .38 .27
(1.7) (7) (6)
Truot Banks
Model (35: -1.0 12 8 -29 7 .48 .15
(2.1) (7) (6) (26) (7)
TIM: -2.1 7 9 .33 .21
(1.2) (5) (4)
Recinnal Banks
Model (3): -.2 2.2 .8 -1.8 .59 .37 .13
(.3) (1.2) (1.0) (4.5) (1.3)
TI:): -.2 1.9 .8 .34 23
(.19) (.8) (.7)
Notes:
1. The holding-period return on bond.. i. approxisated by the following fermula:
Re —BondYieldi -BondYieiç -BondYield i-i
Bond Yield
2. Standard errore are stated in parenthesis and asterisks denote coefficients whose value
differs significantly froa zero at 3 percent.Table EstImated Multi-Index Merkat Models
for Four Classes of Jepanese Banks, 1975-1989
Exchange
intercept Stork Bonds Land Rare
CityBanks
-.09 2.3e .30 -.66 .70 .42
(.31) (1.0) (.87) (3.7) (1.1)
Lotte-TermCreditBenks
-.17 2.3* .76 .02 .58 .70
(.18) (.6) (.51) (2.2) (.67)
Trust Banks
-.2 3.4* 1.3 -3.4 1.2 .71
(.2) (.9) (.7) (3.3) (1.0)
Rerional Banks -
.04 99* .09 -1.1 .06 .54
(.12) (.38) (.33) (1.4) (.43)
Noton
1. The holding-period return on bond, is approximated by the following formula:
R — Bond Yield1 - Bond Yieldt - Bond Yield r-l
Bond Yieldt
2. Standard errors are stated in parenthesis and asterisks denote coefficients whose value
differs significantly from zero at 5 percent.
3.txcept for regional banks, the two-index model has the highest adjusted R2 of all possible
combinations. For regional banks, the third equation listed has the highest adjusted RTable 5: Time-Series Estimates of the Market Model
for Individual Japanese Banks, 1975-1989
—j0 jmRx +uj.
City Banks
Bank of Tokyo .03 1.35*
Dai-Tchi Kangyo Bank -.04 2.05*
Daiwa Bank -.29 333*
Fuji Bank -.06 2.14*
Hokkaido Takushoku -.D3 1.52*
Kyowa Bank -.02 1.36*
Mitsubishi Bank -.07 2.11*
Mitsui Bank .04 1.43
Saitama Bank -.06 1.68*
Sanwa Bank -.08 2.16*
Sumitomo Bank -.02 1.89*
Taiyo Kobe Bank -.09 1.85*
Tokai Bank -.05 1.99*
Long-Term Credit Banks
Industrial Bank of Japan -.07 2.38*
Long-Term Credit Bank -.01 1.62*
Nippon Credit Bank -.02 1.55*
Trust Banks
Mitsubishi Trust -.14 3Q5*
Mitsui Trust -.05 2.01*
Nippon Trust -.11 1.99*
Sumitomo Trust -.15 2.92*
Toyo Trust -.33 4.01*
Yasuda Trust -.13 2.68*
Regional Banks
Akita Bank .18 .00
Aomori Bank .12 .23
Ashikaga Bank -.01 1.28*
Awa Bank -.07 1.44*
Bank of Niroshima -.03 1.20*
Bank of Ikeda -.01 .70
Bank of Twate .10 .47
Chiba Bank .05 .98*
Chiba Kogyo Bank .01 1.20*
Daishi Bank .02 79*
Eighteenth Bank .08 .47
Fukui Bank -.02 1.26
Cunma Bank -.04 1.35*
Nachijuni Bank .11 .67
Higashi Nippon -.09 1.69*
Hokkoku Bank .10 .47
Hokuetsu Bank .04 .69
Hokuriku Bank -.02 1.42*Table 5 (continued)
Rezional Banks
Hyakugo Bank -.07 1.66*
Hyakujushi Bank .03 79*
Iyo Bank .03 74*
Joyo Bank .11 .64
Juroku Bank -.02 1.13*
Kagoahima Bank .13 .22
Kanto Bank -.14 1.68*
Keiyo Bank -.06 1.77*
Kiyo Bank .02 .96*
Muaashino Bank -.07 1.33*
Hiigata Sogo .04 .78
Niahi-Nippon Bank .03 94*
Ogaki Kyoritau flank .06 .69
Oita Bank .11 .14
Shikoku Bank .02 .82
Shinwa Bank .08 .43
Shizuoka Bank .06 1.15*
Sugura Bank .02 .86
Taiyheiyo Bank -.11 2.32*
The 77 Bank -.00 1.15*
Toho Bank .14 .30
Tokyo Sowa -.54 5.29*
Tokyo Tomin Bank .07 .88
Yamagata Bank .06 .68
Yamanashi Bank -.08 1.88*
*Indicatesmarket betas that differ significantly from zero at five
percent.